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Abstract
Our research examines whether the way in which a person encodes a traumatic experience
affects their post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and ability to remember the trauma
over time. In our first study, we were interested in establishing whether people have any existing
beliefs about how encoding processes influence the development of PTSD. In line with Ehlers
and Clark’s (2000) theory, we hypothesized that people would be more likely to indicate that
exclusively paying attention to sensory details during a traumatic event contributes to the
formation of traumatic memories and PTSD. To test this hypothesis, we designed a simple
survey asking about people’s beliefs concerning the relationship between encoding and PTSD as
well as their confidence in those beliefs. In our second study, we examined whether people’s
encoding strategy when they experience a traumatic event affects their later emotions and their
ability to remember that trauma over time. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
encoding conditions—control, conceptually driven (process the meanings of the images) or datadriven (processing the images by focusing on the sensory details)—while they viewed a set of
traumatic photographs from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Greenwald,
Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). In Phase 1, participants took a series of baseline mood measures, were
randomly assigned to an encoding condition, and were shown a series of traumatic photographs.
Participants also monitored the number of intrusions they experienced and took an immediate
Old/New memory test. A week later, participants completed Phase 2 involving a second,
surprise, Old/New memory test. We also assessed participants PTSD symptoms again to see if
their symptomology increased over the week. We hypothesized that participants in our datadriven encoding condition would misremember more trauma over time and experience an
increase in PTSD symptoms (indicating the memory amplification effect). Although our Study 1
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hypothesis was supported, Study 2 hypotheses were not. Nonetheless, our results provide
insights into the importance of encoding strategies following exposure to trauma, changes in
PTSD symptoms, and the potential for subsequent memory amplification following traumatic
experiences.
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The Effects of Conceptually Driven Versus Data-Driven
Encoding in Traumatic Memory Amplification
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a significant mental health disorder that can
develop after a highly stressful or life-threatening event, such as a natural disaster, car accident,
sexual assault, or combat (National Center for PTSD, 2016). According to Breslau, Reboussin,
Anthony and Storr (2005), approximately 8% of people who experience a traumatic event go on
to develop PTSD following exposure. According to the DSM-5, in order for someone to meet
criteria for a PTSD diagnosis, they must experience exposure to a stressor (either directly or
indirectly; Criterion A), they must demonstrate intrusive symptoms such as flashbacks to the
trauma (Criterion B), demonstrate avoidance symptoms including avoiding trauma-related
thoughts/feelings (Criterion C), experience negative alterations in cognitions and moods (e.g.,
negative affect; Criterion D), and must show alterations in arousal and reactivity (e.g., hyper
vigilance; Criterion D; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Overall, in order to meet
criteria for PTSD, one must also experience symptoms for more than one month (Criterion F)
and the symptoms must cause significant functional impairment that is not due to the use of
medication, illness and/or substance use (Criterion G, Criterion H; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). For the purposes of this thesis, we looked specifically at those who have
been directly exposed to a trauma analogue and whether or not they demonstrated diagnostic
criteria including intrusive symptoms and changes in affect. While PTSD and the classification
of its symptoms is important, we still do not know enough about the mechanisms that contribute
to PTSD’s development and continuation. Thus, the present research examines beliefs about, and
the relationship between, how we encode memories for traumatic experiences and subsequent
PTSD symptoms.
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The Formation of Traumatic Memories and PTSD
The critical symptoms of PTSD, those that contribute to the continuation of the disorder,
include intrusions, avoidance, and hyper-reactivity (e.g., startled responses to loud noises).
Intrusions are the sudden remembering or thinking about the traumatic experience (National
Center for PTSD, 2016). Intrusions are a particularly crippling component of PTSD because, by
definition, they occur without warning, are distressing, and can re-traumatize an individual
following their initial traumatic experience (van der Kolk, van der Hart, & Burbridge, 1995).
Avoidance, according to Monson and Shnaider (2014) is purposely avoiding thinking about the
traumatic experience because of the stress it causes. Such avoidance of traumatic memories may
lead to the development of poorly contextualized ideas about the trauma. Over time, that means
that one develops an unclear memory about the details of their traumatic experience (i.e., such as
exactly where they crashed their car, etc.,) and therefore may get confused about the details of
that experience. This inability to contextualize one’s memory for their traumatic experience may
cause the distortion of their traumatic memories. In fact, Rubin, Bernsten, and Bohni (2008)
argue that PTSD is a memory disorder. Therefore, the present studies address the relationship
between trauma, encoding, and memory distortion by determining whether or not we have
existing beliefs about the way someone encodes a traumatic experience, as well as how that
encoding effects their ability to remember that trauma and their degree of PTSD symptomology
over time.
The Cognitive Model
In line with this idea, Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed the Cognitive Model of PTSD. It
stipulates that how one processes or encodes a traumatic experience may affect their memory and
PTSD symptoms. They proposed that PTSD occurs and persists, when people encode, or store, a
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traumatic experience in a way that, when reminded of that trauma, makes them feel like they are
in a state of ongoing threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This threat comes about in one of two ways.
The first occurs when a person creates excessive, negative appraisals, or generates a lot of
negative thoughts about their experience; the second occurs when an individual poorly
contextualizes, or develops a poor understanding of their experience (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In
other words, the Cognitive Model for PTSD suggests that the way we encode a traumatic
experience directly relates to how severe that person’s PTSD symptomology becomes. In
particular, the Cognitive Model posits that when people process specific details of an experience,
or use data-driven encoding processes, they are more likely to poorly contextualize their
traumatic experiences and thus are more likely to experience persistent PTSD symptoms.
To elaborate, the two main types of encoding strategies are conceptually driven and datadriven encoding. In conceptually driven encoding, an individual conceptualizes or makes
meaning of what they encounter holistically (Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 2016). For example,
if involved in a car accident, a person who processes this traumatic experience in a conceptually
driven manner, would think about the fact that they are in a car accident, and what it might mean,
rather than focus on any sensory details. By contrast, in data-driven encoding, the person would
focus on, and thus remember specific, sensory details of the traumatic event, such as the sound of
broken glass or the smell of blood (Oulton et al., 2016). The research on which encoding strategy
has more detrimental effects on PTSD however, has produced inconsistent results.
For example, Krans, Pearson, Maier, and Moulds (2016) tested Ehlers and Clark’s (2000)
Cognitive Model by manipulating the contextual information given to participants when exposed
to traumatic images. Contrary to Ehlers and Clark’s model, Krans and colleagues (2016)
hypothesized that the conceptual processing that takes place during a traumatic experience would
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actually increase PTSD symptoms, contrary to Ehlers and Clark’s proposal. Thus, in Part 1 of
their study, “healthy” participants, defined as those without PTSD, viewed pictures depicting
traumatic scenes. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; the moderate
outcome, severe outcome, and control group. Meaning that, those in the moderate outcome group
were given a sentence with contextual information indicating that the situation shown was
moderately traumatic (i.e., “There were many survivors”; Krans et al., 2016). Whereas, those in
the severe condition were given contextual information indicating that the situation shown was
severely traumatic (i.e., “There were few survivors”; Krans et al., 2016). All experimental
participants received written narratives, which provided contextual information designed to assist
in understanding and establishing meaning (i.e., the details about what was happening in the
scene shown) about the negative scenes they were shown. By contrast, control participants saw
photos with no context narrative given. In Part 2, participants took a memory test for what they
were shown. All participants were also asked to self-report intrusion experiences in diaries. A
week later, participants returned to complete an adapted version of the Impact of Events Scales
(IES), a self-report measure that assesses a person’s distress surrounding a specific event on a
Likert scale (i.e., “I had trouble concentrating”, 0=not at all, 4= Extremely; Horowitz, Wilner, &
Alvarez, 1979). Krans and colleagues (2008) ultimately found that the severe traumatic scene
group experienced significantly more intrusions in comparison to the moderate or no context
conditions.
By contrast, Barba, Mantovan, Traykov, Rieu, Laurent, Ermani, and Devouche (2002)
sought to determine if an interfering task designed to disrupt participant’s encoding of traumatic
scenes—and thus lead to data-driven processing—would elicit more intrusions and worse free
recall performance for the stimuli. In their first experiment, Barba and colleagues found that
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interference had no significant effect on participants’ ability to retrieve correct information
during free recall or the number of intrusions experienced. In their second experiment however,
they added an interference task at both encoding and retrieval. Now, there was a significant
negative effect on participant’s memory and a significant increase in participant’s number of
intrusions. Thus, Barba and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that data-driven processing could
increase PTSD symptoms.
Additionally, Segovia, Strange, and Takarangi (2016) examined whether different
encoding instructions affect participants’ memory errors and PTSD symptoms. To allow for an
objective measurement of memory disorganization using controlled methods, Segovia and
colleagues (2016) had participants watch a traumatic film with missing scenes, and randomly
assigned participants to one of three conditions. Participants in the conceptually driven encoding
condition were told to focus on the meaning of the event. Participants in the data-driven
encoding condition where told to focus on sensory details. Meanwhile, control group participants
were not given instructions during the film. Participants recorded their intrusions for one week.
Then, after a week delay participants returned to the lab to report their analogue PTSD
symptoms, had their memory tested for the film, and rated their confidence rated based on what
they reported remembering from the film. Segovia and colleagues’ (2016) results showed that the
instructions did not matter. However, people who self-reported feeling more disorganization in
their memory also reported more memory distortion and avoidance symptoms of PTSD.
Meaning that, their objective measures did not support Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theory. Instead,
they found that participant’s self-reported sense of memory was unorganized or lacked meaning,
leading to increased symptoms of PTSD.
To summarize, all of the above studies have tested Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) Cognitive
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Model but have all presented inconsistent results on which encoding strategy actually worsens
PTSD symptoms. With, at best, mixed empirical evidence to support that encoding contributes to
increased PTSD symptoms, it is imperative that we continue to explore not only the effects of
encoding on these symptoms, but how encoding may also effect the distortion of our traumatic
memories in line with Rubin and colleagues (2008) more recent proposal.
Memory Distortion and PTSD
Rubin and colleagues (2008) coined the relationship between memories for traumatic
events and PTSD symptoms the “memory model of PTSD.” They proposed that the current
memory one has for a traumatic event, not the event itself, drives symptomology. Most
importantly, this model emphasizes that trauma memories are not consistent over time. Instead,
trauma memories can be distorted by various factors like expectations, social support, and
current emotions related to the memory for the event (Rubin et al., 2008). Indeed, memories are
constructive by their nature. That makes them malleable, as well as subject to change and error.
Certainly, people can come to remember additional details of events as well as totally false,
detailed, memories for events that never actually occurred (Bartlett, 1932;
Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry, & Loftus, 2012; Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Bernstein, 2005;
Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). This fact of memory also extends to traumatic events
(Crombag, Wagenaar, & Van Koppen, 1996; Granhag, Stromwall, & Billings, 2003;
Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002; Pezdek, 2003).
In brief, trauma theorists had maintained that trauma memory was special; that a different
kind of memory system was responsible. For example, Freud argued that traumatic memories are
unconsciously buried by repression of the event, but could be recovered often decades later, with
little memory error (Freud & Breuer, 1893–1895). Other researchers, such as Van der Kolk
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(1994) argued that the “body kept the score.” That is, that trauma was stored in sensory-motor
and emotional fragments (e.g., images of the trauma with no accompanying memory; Van der
Kolk, 1994). However, since the 1990s, research has demonstrated that traumatic memories are
not processed by a different memory system as originally proposed.
Take for example, flashbulb memories. A flashbulb memory—say your memory of
9/11—was thought of as a “photographic print” and the memory was assumed special in its
ability to be fixed and permanent over time (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Peterson & Bell, 1996).
Flashbulb memories got their name from the idea that when a highly emotional event takes place
(i.e., community events like natural disasters, terror attacks, etc.,), a special type of memory is
formed, as if the event was recorded, and preserved for all time (Brown & Kulik, 1977). In their
original study, Brown and Kulik (1977) examined peoples’ memories of John F. Kennedy’s
assassination nearly fourteen years after they experienced this highly publicized and emotional
event. All participants were able to recall context-related information—where they were at the
time, who they were with, what they were doing, etc., —when President Kennedy was killed.
Many studies have replicated this basic finding regarding context-related recall: people claim
vivid memories of 9/11, spaceship explosions, deaths of celebrities and world leaders, and
natural disasters (e.g., Bahrick, Parker, Fivush, & Levitt, 1998; Neisser & Harsch, 1992;
Peterson & Bell, 1996).
But Brown and Kulik’s (1977) study missed a crucial fact. Although people, specifically
their participants, may have been able to report a large number of details about their highly
emotional memories, those details are not necessarily accurate. In fact, Neisser and Harsch
(1992) found that flashbulb memories were remembered inconsistently overtime, not as a perfect
recording of the event. Likewise, other studies have shown that memories for emotional events

	
  

12	
  

tend to be poorly remembered over time - not preserved in a special way (Clifford & Hollin,
1981; Loftus & Burns, 1982). Instead of suggesting that emotions encourage the recording-like
preservation of memories for those who have experience trauma, these studies have shown that
emotions appear to have the opposite effect, often impairing the memory rather than perfecting it
(Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Loftus & Burns, 1982).
To be clear, intense emotions have been shown to affect the strength of traumatic memories
(Levine & Edelstein, 2009). That is, central details are those that are conceptually associated
with key details of an event (e.g., the fact that a car accident occurred). These details are
typically better remembered for emotional events (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). By contrast,
peripheral information, details not directly related to the key facts of an experience (e.g., the
color of the shirt you were wearing during a car accident), are less likely to be remembered for
emotional events (Reisberger & Heuer, 2004). Termed the memory narrowing effect, this effect
has been replicated in several studies using different modes of presenting information such as
films, narratives, and even simple words (Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Levine & Burgess, 1997;
MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004; Safer, Christianson, Autry,
& Osterlund, 1998). Importantly, this memory narrowing effect helps to explain why people
think their trauma memories are special and unchanging because they believe that emotional,
central details that they may remember to vividly are correct, even when they are not.
Memory Amplification
Contrary to such notions that memories are special and preserved, the memory
amplification effect describes how trauma memories can amplify (become more distorted) as
PTSD symptoms fail to improve, or get worse, overtime. Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, and
Charney (1997) were the first to demonstrate this memory amplification effect. They assessed
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Gulf War Veteran’s exposure to war-related stressors (i.e., seeing comrades killed, being or
seeing others wounded by combat, etc.) one month after returning from deployment, and again
two years later. Participants completed the Desert Storm Questionnaire and the Mississippi Scale
for Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder at one month and 2 years post-deployment.
The Desert Storm Questionnaire was used to target the veterans’ particular Persian Gulf
experiences via 19 self-report items where participant’s indicated if they had or had not
experienced the items (i.e., extreme threat to one’s personal safety, living close enemy lines).
Similarly, the Mississippi Scale for Combat-related PTSD used 35 self-report items to assess the
veterans PTSD symptom severity and the effect those symptoms had on the veterans’ lives.
Southwick and colleagues (1997) compared the participants’ one-month and 2 year responses to
both questionnaires. Results revealed that 88% of veterans who originally said they had not been
exposed to war-related stressors later changed their response to yes at their two year follow up.
In other words, these veterans actually endorsed being exposed to more war-related stressors
over time. Most importantly however, these findings also demonstrated a correlation between
memory distortion and more PTSD symptoms exhibited overtime- demonstrating the memory
amplification effect.
Similar findings have been shown with peacekeepers (Bolton, Gray, & Litz,
2006; Bramsen, Dirkzwager, van Esch, & van der Ploeg, 2001; Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, Ehlich, &
Friedman, 1998), prisoners of war (Dekel, Solomon, & Ein-Dor, 2016) and various veteran
populations (Alosco, Aslan, Du, Ko, Grande, Proctor, Concato, & Vasterling, 2016; Wilson,
Hoge, McGurk, Thomas, & Castro, 2010; Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, Kutter, & Kaloupek,
2003; Wessely, Unwin, Hotopf, Hull, Ismail, Nicolaou, & David, 2003). Memory amplification
has also been demonstrated in shared natural disasters. For example, Heir, Piatigorsky, and
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Weisaeth (2009) surveyed 532 individuals who endured the South-East Asia Tsunami of 2004.
Participants were asked about how much danger they believed they were in at two points-six
months and a year after the tsunami occurred (Heir et al., 2009). They found a positive
correlation between perceived life threats over time with a lack of improvement of PTSD
symptoms (Heir et al., 2009). Meaning that, their memories regarding the level of threat became
distorted over time, in the same way that their PTSD symptoms failed to improve; again,
demonstrating the memory amplification effect.
However, most of the research on this topic has focused on field studies with participants
pre-disposed to trauma (i.e., veterans who developed PTSD after exposure to combat during
war), which has prevented the use of control measures (i.e., the context by which the traumatic
experience occurred, the way the person developed meaning for the experience, etc.) and has
yielded limited sample sizes (Anastasides, Beck, Pang, Servatius, Gilbertson, Orr, & Myers,
2015; Dickie, Brunet, Akerib, & Armony, 2011; Scott, Woods, Wrocklage, Schweinsburg,
Southwick, & Krystal, 2016). Moreover, there was a distinct lack of control of any of the key
variables (i.e., the timing of the traumatic event, the length of time since the event). While these
studies have inherently lacked internal validity, in terms of external validity, we know that
participants experienced real time trauma, which has allowed for actual cases of memory
amplification to be explored.
To avoid some of the internal deficits of these studies however, Strange and Takarangi
(2012) attempted to determine whether or not intrusions contribute to the memory amplification
effect in a controlled laboratory setting. To do this, participants were shown a short film
depicting a fatal car accident. The film was broken up into short clips, some were traumatic (i.e.,
watching the cars hit each other, the blood on the victims, emergency crews attempting to rescue
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the passengers) some were not (i.e., clips of what the drivers were doing prior to the accident, the
passengers talking to one another). Participants then returned twenty-four hours later and
completed a memory test comprised of Old clips (clips they actually saw), control (New), and
missing (footage that was purposely removed from the film they saw) clips. Participants were
asked to identify whether or not the clips shown were Old (i.e., from the film) or New (i.e., clips
they had never seen). Strange and Takarangi (2012) found that participants successfully
recognized the control and Old clips. Critically, participants claimed that they saw twenty-six
percent of the missing clips that they were never actually shown and many of these clips also
happened to be the most traumatic (i.e., review of the deceased bodies at the accident scene). The
rate at which participants also reported re-experiencing these traumatic clips (that is, experienced
intrusions of the film) was correlated with the number of memory errors they made. Thus,
Strange and Takarangi (2012) suggested that a failure in source-monitoring might explain their
effect.
The source-monitoring framework suggests that people do not properly store details of
experiences in their memories with labels that specify where those experiences come from. As a
result, they tend to rely on heuristics or memory shortcuts, such as how familiar the experience
felt, (how much perceptual detail they have for that memory, etc.,) to determine whether or not
the details of their memories are imagined, or if they actually occurred. Because people use these
shortcuts, they can frequently mistake information they think they remember because these
distorted memories feel familiar and come to mind with a lot of detail. Critically, intrusions
typically meet these same criteria. Therefore, Strange and Takarangi (2012) suggested people
might confuse their intrusive thoughts for something they actually experienced (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 2016).
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To test this proposal, Strange and Takarangi (2014) again had all participants watch the
traumatic film, this time they warned participants that some scenes had been removed, expecting
this instruction would increase systematic source monitoring. Additionally, Strange and
Takarangi put labels on some of the missing clips, describing what was missing, expecting that
these labels would increase heuristic source monitoring. Their prediction was correct: false
recognition rates were higher when participants saw labels and lower when they just got a
warning. Thus, source monitoring ability can be manipulated and appears to be one mechanism
explaining traumatic memory distortion. However, Strange and Takarangi did not measure
memory amplification, per se. They only had one memory test. This is problematic because
memory amplification speaks to the distortion of memory over time. With only one memory test,
Strange and Takarangi (2014) could only measure immediate memory distortion, not the
memory amplification effect.
To address these limitations, Oulton and colleagues (2016) designed a laboratory experiment
that more carefully matched the field studies. First, they randomly assigned participants to one of
two conditions: the single test and the multiple test condition. Participants in the single test
condition served as the control group and only took one memory test a week later. However, the
multiple test group received a memory test twenty minutes following encoding and once again a
week later to assess the memory amplification affect. All participants completed several PTSD
symptom measures including the Traumatic History Screen (THS), the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI-T), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), the Positive Affect Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS), the Experience of Intrusion Scale (EIS), and the PTSD Checklist
(PLC-5). Next, participants viewed a set of buffer photos, followed by a set of target photographs
from a computer screen. These buffer photos were used to control for primacy and recency
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effects that may have subsequently influenced the memory-testing results. Participants then
completed the PANAS measure for a second time. Participants in the single-test condition were
provided paper diaries to record their intrusions for a week and sent away. Whereas, participants
in the multiple test condition completed crossword puzzles for an additional 20 minutes, then
completed an immediate recognition test, and the PTSD Checklist (PCL-5). Multiple-test
participants too, were then given paper diaries to record their intrusions for a week. Following
the week delay all participants were emailed a survey that included the PANAS, delayed
recognition test, an EIS, and PCL test. Results of Study 1 indicated that analogue symptoms of
PTSD were positively associated with remembering more negative images over time- again,
demonstrating the memory amplification effect.
Following these results, Oulton and colleagues (2016) conducted a second study to focus on
the association between those whose memory amplified over time and their subsequent PTSD
symptoms. The study followed the same approach as their Study 1, except all participants
completed two tests and they did not complete the THS, BDI-II, STAI-T, or the intrusion dairy.
Results of this Study 2, found that participants whose memory of the photos amplified over time
also demonstrated more re-experiencing PTSD symptoms. Thus, Oulton and her colleagues
(2016) also demonstrated evidence for the memory amplification effect. We follow Oulton and
colleagues’ (2016) methodology here to test our own research questions.
The Present Studies
We had several goals in conducting this research. First, we were interested in establishing
whether people have any existing beliefs about how one processes a traumatic event might
contribute to their development of PTSD symptoms. If so, then it would lend some support to
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) theory. Indeed, these beliefs may establish that there is a general
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expectation people hold about how PTSD develops. Therefore, in Study 1, we surveyed people
regarding their beliefs about how encoding strategies influence the development of PTSD. In
Study 2, we conducted an experimental study, manipulating the type of encoding people could
use during a traumatic event. Our goal for Study 2, was to determine if in fact, data-driven as
opposed to conceptual processing, leads to an increase in memory distortion and PTSD
symptoms.
Study 1
In our first study, we were interested in establishing whether people have any existing
beliefs about how encoding processes influence the development of PTSD. Thus we designed a
simple survey comprised of a short paragraph defining the symptoms of PTSD followed by a
brief newspaper article detailing a woman, Alex’s, traumatic car accident. We then asked
participants a single question designed to probe their beliefs concerning the relationship between
encoding and PTSD. We also asked them to rate how confident they were in their answer.
Hypothesis
H1.Based on Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) Cognitive Model, we hypothesized that people
would be more likely to indicate that paying attention to sensory details during a traumatic event
contributes to the formation of traumatic memories and PTSD.
Method
Research Design
The study was a simple survey. There was no manipulated factor.
Participants
We recruited a total of 314 participants from the undergraduate research pool at John Jay
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College of Criminal Justice. Participants were given extra credit for completing the survey. Of
the 314, 261 participants fully completed the study. Participants in this study were not asked to
identify their age, gender, or ethnicity.
Materials and Procedure
This survey was designed and administered using Qualtrics. Participants gave their
consent to participate before beginning the survey and were informed that they could withdraw
their consent to participate at any time. Participants were told that the study was about “facts and
evidence from an investigation of a crime,” to avoid providing any biasing information. The John
Jay Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this study. See Appendix A for Study 1’s
informed consent and instructions.
Introduction to PTSD. First, participants were asked to read a short paragraph that
defined and listed some symptoms of PTSD (see Appendix B). Once participants finished
reading this informational paragraph, they were asked to click the arrow to continue.
Specifically, participants read the following:
“Posttraumatic stress disorder is a mental health condition that typically follows
exposure to some kind of trauma (i.e., a car accident). Symptoms of PTSD include,
but are not limited to:
•

Unwanted thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event (Intrusions)

•

Nightmares

•

Persistent worry and fear (Anxiety)

•

Heightened sensitivity to what is going on around you with the fear that

something might go wrong (Hyper-vigilance)
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•

Purposefully trying not to think about or remember the trauma (Avoidant

thinking)
•

Zoning out, creating a disconnect between your awareness and what is happening

in real time (Dissociation)”
Newspaper Article. Participants were then instructed to read an article that they were
told was printed in a local newspaper. It was titled, “Women Suffers Several Injuries Following
Car Crash On Way to a Night Out with Friends.” This newspaper article (see Appendix C) was
written by the author and does not reflect an actual event. This newspaper article explained how
the main character, Alex, was texting and driving on her way to dinner with friends when she hit
another car, causing her to suffer painful injuries including a sprained neck, broken arm, and
heavy bleeding which required several stitches. The newspaper article provided the sensory
details of this accident, as well as a statement from Alex, which detailed her thinking before and
after the accident. After reading the newspaper article, participants were asked to click on an
arrow to continue with the survey.
Encoding Style Question. Immediately following the newspaper article, participants
were told (see also Appendix D):
“Alex developed PTSD as a result of this accident. Which of the following
explanations do you think is most likely WHY she developed PTSD:
1.

Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the sound of the other

car’s horn honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the pain of the
glass cutting into her skin, etc.,).
2.

Alex focused on how the accident happened and why it happened to her (i.e., she

was rushing, she went through the windshield because she did not have her seatbelt on,
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she dropped her phone and took her eyes off the road and that’s why she did not see
someone hit her, etc.,).
3.

It does not matter what Alex focused on during the accident.”

Confidence Rating and Explanation. Participants were then asked to rate their
confidence in their selection using a Likert Scale (0 = Not at all Confident, 100 = Completely
Confident). Participants were given an additional open-ended space to type explanations for their
confidence ratings (see Appendix E).
Debriefing. After completing all prior components of the survey, participants were
thanked for their participation and debriefed. Participants were informed of the true purpose of
the survey, which was to examine whether or not people believe that how someone encodes a
traumatic event, effects their PTSD symptomology (See Appendix F).
Results and Discussion
Recall that we hypothesized participants would be more likely to indicate that paying
attention to sensory details during a traumatic event contributes to the formation of traumatic
memories and PTSD. Our hypothesis was supported. Participants were more likely to endorse
option 1 of the encoding question, “Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the
sound of the other car’s horn honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the
pain of the glass cutting into her skin, etc.,).” Indeed, a chi square analysis revealed that
participants were significantly more likely to believe that focusing on sensory factors led to
PTSD: X2 (N =261) = 26.94, p < .01. See Table 1 below for the means and standard deviations
for each option as well as the corresponding confidence rating.
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Table 1
Mean Confidence Ratings and Standard Deviations Based on Selection Chosen
Selection Chosen (1-3)
Count of
Mean Confidence
Participants
Rating
1- Alex focused on the sensory details of 130
68.48
the accident…
2- Alex focused on how the accident
74
67.69
happened and why it happened to her…
3- It does not matter…
57
58.09

Standard
Deviation
1.71
2.26
2.58

We also anticipated that participant’s who selected option 1 would be significantly more
confident than those who selected option 2 and 3. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was a
significant difference in the confidence ratings of participants who selected the three different
options, F (2, 260) = 6.06, p < .01. However, follow up t-tests reveal that it was option 3
participants, “It does not matter…” who were significantly less confident in their selection
(Option 1 & 3: t (185) = 32.48, p < .01; Option 2 & 3: t (129) = 22.65, p < .01). This may mean
then, that people actually believe that encoding styles matter, but did not know which option was
“right.” And thus, when they chose option 3 they were less confident.
In summary, it appears that people’s beliefs regarding the development of PTSD may
align with that of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) proposal. As previously discussed, the Cognitive
Model is a psychological framework, suggesting that PTSD persists when people encode, or
store, a traumatic experience into their memory in a way that, when reminded of that trauma,
makes them feel like they are in a state of ongoing threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Here,
participants endorsed the idea that by focusing on the sensory details Alex was exposed to during
her car accident, she was more likely to develop PTSD. More specifically, participants more
often endorsed that her data-driven encoding strategy caused the character, Alex, to poorly
contextualize her traumatic experiences, causing her persistent PTSD symptoms. In Study 2, we
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tested whether those beliefs match the empirical evidence as these lay beliefs may also affect
people’s expectancies for responses to trauma.	
  
Study	
  2	
  
	
  
Our second study, Study 2, examined whether people’s encoding strategy when they
experience a traumatic event, affects their later emotions and their ability to remember that
trauma over time. We hypothesized that participants in our data-driven encoding condition
would misremember more trauma over time, indicating “New photos in Phase 2 as “Old.” In
addition, despite the mixed evidence we discussed in the Introduction, in line with Ehlers and
Clark (2000) proposal and our Study 1 results, we hypothesized that participants in our datadriven encoding condition would experience more analogue PTSD symptoms over time.
Notably, if both occurred, we would have evidence that the memory amplification effect is more
likely after data-driven processing.
Hypotheses
H1. We first hypothesized that data-driven participants would be less likely to remember
the photos in immediate testing because if they are just focusing on the sensory details, they are
likely not encoding the images as well as they would without an instruction or with a conceptual
instruction.
H2. In addition, we hypothesized that those in the data-driven encoding condition would
misremember more trauma over time.
H3. Lastly, we hypothesized that data-driven participants would demonstrate more PTSD
symptoms.
Methods
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Note that this thesis was part of a much larger project. Thus, a number of measures were
collected that were beyond the scope of this thesis. I describe below all of the measures, and note
what was not analyzed in this thesis.
Research Design
The study conformed to a 3 (Encoding Manipulation: conceptually driven, data-driven,
and control) x 2 (Test 1, Test 2), mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three encoding conditions—control, conceptual, or data-driven. Those in the data-driven
encoding condition (N = 63) were given specific instructions to pay attention to the sensory
details of each photograph they were shown at encoding, such as the sound of breaking glass.
Those in the conceptually driven encoding condition (N = 63) were also given instructions to
make meaning of each photograph they were shown at encoding. For example, if the image
depicted a deadly car accident, participants were instructed to acknowledge that they were
looking at a fatal car accident. Those in the control condition (N = 64) were not given any
encoding instructions.
Participants
We recruited a total of 389 participants. Of the 389, 143 participants dropped out of the
study, meaning that they did not complete Phase 2. We also removed participants who, due to a
survey-flow error received additional questions at encoding (N = 52), or reported experiencing
technical difficulties (N = 4). Out of the 190 participants who completed the study, 120 identified
as female and 70 participants identified as male. Our participants ranged in age from 17-65 years
old with a mean age of 21 years (SD = 5.44). We did not collect data on ethnicity.
Materials
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Trauma Stimulus. Following Oulton and colleagues’ (2016) design, the trauma stimulus
was 80 standardized International Affect Picture System (IAPS) photographs, which depict
traumatic, negative scenes such as severe burns, death, and car accidents (Lang et al., 1993). The
photographs were counterbalanced into four sets of 20 photos. An additional 10 negative photos
were shown at the beginning and at the end of the encoding phase. These photos were used for
all participants, never tested more than once and acted as recency and primacy buffers for the
traumatic photos (see Appendix G).
Photo Ratings. To assess mood following encoding, participants were asked to rate how
distressing, disgusting, and unpleasant they found each photo (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). To
assess our participant’s focus and level of attention during testing, we also asked our participants
to rate how closely they paid attention to each photo (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely closely).
Doing so told use several things about how participants reacted to our encoding phase. First, this
attention rating showed us whether or not participants in one encoding condition paid more
attention than another, as perhaps this could have influenced our results. Secondly, assessing
participant’s attention to our trauma analogue tells us something about participants’ engagement
in the overall encoding process.
Trauma History Screen (THS). Participants completed the Trauma History Screen
(THS) to measure their past traumatic experiences and to establish their baseline moods. Carlson,
Smith, Palmieri, Dalenberg, Ruzek, Kimerling, Burling, & Spain (2011) developed the THS to
examine the frequency of traumatic events and these events’ association with a person’s
exposure to high magnitude stressor events (HMS) as well as their persisting post-traumatic
distress symptoms (PPD). For example, participants were asked, “Have you ever been in a car
accident,” to which they could have responded “yes or no.” The THS is a self-report measure
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with high construct validity, as supported by correlations found between the PTSD Checklist
(PCL-C) scores (which measures PTSD symptoms) and HMS scores found in both veteran (0.41)
and college participants (0.22; Carlson et al., 2011). I do not analyze these data here.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). Participants completed the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to measure their baseline depression symptoms.
To complete the BDI-II, participants rated each of the 21 items on a Likert scale (e.g., 0 = I do
not feel like a failure, 3 = I feel I am a complete failure as a person). The BDI-II correlates well
with the depression subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R) (r = 0.89; Steer,
Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1997). BDI–II also has high internal consistency, particularly amongst
college students, which is noteworthy given that most of our sample comprised of students (α =
0.93; Beck et al., 1996). I do not analyze these data here.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T). In addition, participants
completed the trait subscale from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Scale (STAI-T)
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The STAI-T is another self-report measure where
participants rated 20 items (e.g., “I lack self-confidence”) on a Likert scale (1 = almost never, 4 =
almost always; see Appendix H). The STAI-T yields high test-retest reliability (r = 0.88) and has
high internal consistency (α = 0.89) and (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). We used the STAI-T to
establish participant’s baseline feelings of anxiety. I do not analyze these data here.
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Participants completed both the
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule subscales (positive and negative) (PANAS) prior to
and following encoding to measure their pre and post positive (PA) and negative affects (NA;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Both the positive and negative subscales are measured on a
Likert scale with items like “Distressed” and “Attentive” (i.e., 1 = very slightly or not at all, to
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5= extremely). The PA subscale is negatively correlated with the BDI (r = −0.34) and the NA
subscale is highly correlated with the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) (r = 0.74). The testretest reliability for PANAS is also high (0.81 (NA) and 0.79 (PA) and yields excellent
convergent and divergent correlations (Watson et al., 1988).
Intrusion Monitoring and Vigilance Task. Following baseline mood measures and the
encoding phase, participants simultaneously completed an intrusion monitoring and vigilance
task. To monitor intrusions after the encoding phase, participants pressed a key when they
experienced an intrusive memory. We defined intrusions for the participants as the sudden
remembering or re-experiencing of negative feelings about the traumatic photographs (Oulton et
al., 2016). For each intrusion participant’s experienced, they wrote down a description of that
intrusion’s content. These descriptions included details, such as whether the intrusion was a
thought and/or an image, the level of distress the intrusion caused the participant (1 = not at all, 5
= extremely), the vividness of the intrusion (1 = not at all vivid, 5 = extremely vivid), and how
hard the participant tried to forget about the intrusion as it occurred (1 = not at all, 5 =
completely). The intrusion task was used to provide a more controlled means of recording
intrusions as opposed to having participants complete individual diary entries. During this
intrusion monitoring process, participants also worked on a tedious vigilance task, which
involved identifying vertical lines amongst horizontal lines on the computer. To assess
participant’s engagement in the intrusion task, we also asked them to rate how well they
conformed to the monitoring phase instructions (1 = not at all well, 7 = extremely well). We
chose this specific computer task as it has been shown to reliably prompt task-unrelated
thoughts, allowing for intrusions to occur (Oulton et al., 2016; Giambra, 1989). I do not analyze
these data here.
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Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS). We also used the Experiences of Intrusions Scale
(EIS; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park & Litz, 2009). The EIS uses five self-reports items to
assess the quality of participant’s intrusions. Participants rated the occurrence, unwantedness and
randomness of their subsequent intrusions. Participants also rated the level of distress and
interference they experienced because of their intrusions (1 = not at all/almost never, 5 =
extremely/very frequently). The EIS correlates well with other intrusion measures such as the reexperiencing subscale of the PCL-C (PTSD Checklist for Civilians; Weathers et al., 1993; r =
0.22) and yields both good test-retest reliability (r = 0.83) and internal consistency (Cronbach’s
α’s > 0.83). I do not analyze these data here.
Recognition Memory Test. Following Oulton and colleagues (2016), our immediate and
delayed memory tests included one set of previously encoded photos (“Old” photos) and two sets
of photos that had not been shown, considered “New” photos. Of the New photos, one set of
pictures was the target, traumatic photos. For the Phase 1 immediate memory test, participants
identified “Old” (pictures they had seen before) or “New” (pictures they had not seen) and
indicated how confident they are in their “Old” and “New” ratings (1 = not at all confident, 10 =
extremely confident). A week later in Phase 2, participants completed the delayed recognition
memory test, which contained different photos compared to the immediate test but followed the
same methodological design (see Appendix I).
PTSD Checklist (PCL). Lastly, participants completed the PTSD Checklist (PCL;
Weathers, et al., 1993). The PCL is a 17 item self-report measure we used to assess participants’
trauma symptoms in both phases. For example, following Phase 1 encoding, participants were
asked “feeling jumpy or easily startled,” to which they would respond, 1 = not at all up to 5 =
extremely. Test-retest reliability for the PCL is high (r = 0.96; Weathers et al., 1993). The PCL

	
  

29	
  

correlates well with other PTSD measures (like the Impact of Event Scale- a PTSD symptom
measure commonly used following traumatic experiences; re-experiencing: r = 0.76, hyper
arousal: r = 0.64, avoidance: r = 0.71; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; Ruggiero, Del Ben,
Scotti, & Rabalais, 2003; Vreven, Gudanowski, King, & King, 1995). The PCL also has high
internal consistency (re-experiencing: α = 0.94, hyper-arousal: α = 0.92, avoidance: α = 0.91;
Keen, Kutter, Niles & Krinsley, 2008).
Procedure
Our procedure followed that of Oulton and colleagues (2016), the only difference was the
instructions participants were given about what to do with each photo during the encoding phase.
Phase 1 All participants began by reading and signing our consent form (see Appendix
J). Prior to receiving encoding training and instructions on how to use their assigned encoding
strategy, all participants completed measures to establish their baseline moods. These measures
included the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS), the Trauma History Screen (THS), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait scale
(STAI-T) as described above. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three
encoding conditions—control, conceptual, or data-driven. Those in the data-driven encoding
condition were given specific instructions to pay attention to the sensory details of each
photograph they were shown, such as the sound of breaking glass. Those in the conceptually
driven encoding condition were also given instructions to make meaning of the traumatic
photographs. For example, if the image depicted a deadly car accident, participants should have
acknowledged that they were looking at a fatal car accident. Finally, those in the control
condition were not given any encoding instructions. After completing their training examples,
participants moved onto the encoding phase. Here, participants viewed a series of traumatic
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(IAPS) photos as well as the buffer photographs at the beginning and end of the photo set.
Participants saw each photograph for 2.5 seconds and a blank screen appeared after each
photograph for 1.5 seconds. Following the encoding phase, participants completed the PANAS
measure for a second time, and were instructed to press “x” on a keyboard when they
experienced an intrusion (intrusion monitoring task), or unwanted thought/feeling about the
traumatic photos). Finally, participants completed an immediate memory test for the photographs
they were shown. This test asked participants to identify if the pictures they were shown were
“New” as in they have not seen them before or if the picture is “Old” as in they have seen this
picture before in a random order. Participants also indicated how confident they were in their
“Old” and “New” ratings (1 = not at all confident, 10 = extremely confident). They also
completed the PCL.
Phase 2 A week later, participants were emailed Phase 2 of the study. In Phase 2,
participants were given an additional, different, memory test. This second memory test worked
the same way as the immediate memory test. Participants indicated whether the traumatic photos
they were shown were “Old”, as in they have seen the photograph before, or “New” as in they
have not seen the photograph before. This step determined whether participants misremembered
the traumatic photographs over the course of the week. In Phase 2, participants also completed
the EIS to measure their intrusion experiences, the PCL, and the PANAS measure again to see if
their PTSD symptomology had increased over the week. To conclude, all participants were
debriefed and thanked for their participation (see Appendix K).
Results
We began our data analyses by examining whether participants were affected by the
photos: the PANAS ratings before and after the encoding phase as well as examining how much
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attention they paid to the photos, how disgusting, unpleasant, and distressing they found them.
We then examined participants’ memory test performance at Time 1. Finally, we examined
participants’ sensitivity and response bias to the photos, our measure of memory amplification,
and their analogue symptoms according to the PCL.
Responses to the Photos
To determine whether the photographs affected participants emotionally, we compared
their PANAS subscale scores before and after viewing the IAPS photos. We conducted two 2
(time 1 versus time 2 PANAS ratings) x 3 (condition: conceptually driven encoding, data-driven
encoding, and control) repeated measures ANOVAs one on the positive affect subscale and one
on the negative affect subscale. There were no significant differences between the conditions on
either subscale, all p > .34.
In terms of attention during encoding of the photos, all conditions were comparable for
attention to the memory test F(2, 187) = 1.21, p = .30 (see Table 2). In addition, the proportion of
participants who indicated that they looked away during photo encoding and testing was
comparable across all conditions, p = .50 for encoding and p = .82 for testing. The proportion of
participants who left the study during the encoding phase was also comparable across all
conditions, p = .51.
Finally, as Tables 2 and 3 reveal, there was no effect on condition in participants rating of
the photos as disgusting, distressing, and unpleasant. This is significant because we know that
our analogue worked in its ability to elicit emotional responses for trauma.
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Table 2
Time 1 Mean Photo Ratings (SE in parentheses)
Condition
Time 1
Time 1
Unpleasant
Distress
Rating
Rating
Control

5.51
(.34)
5.51
(.27)
5.68
(.35)
0.23
< .79

Conceptually
Driven
Data-Driven
F
P

5.42
(.35)
5.68
(.28)
5.48
(.36)
.19
< .82

Table 3
Time 2 Mean Photo Ratings (SE in parentheses)
Condition
Time 2
Time 2
Time 2
How often
Distress
How often
did you
Rating
did the
think
images pop
about the
into your
photos?
head out of
the blue?
Control
Conceptually
Driven
Data-Driven
F
P

1.70
(.17)
1.68
(.14)
1.88
(.18)
0.42
< .66

1.93
(.18)
2.12
(.14)
1.92
(.18)
.54
< .58

1.56
(.15)
1.61
(.12)
1.80
(.16)
.72
< .49

Time 1
Disgust
Rating

Time 1
Attention
Rating

5.73
(.33)
5.78
(.26)
5.20
(.34)
1.00
< .37

5.62
(.21)
6.02
(.17)
5.56
(.22)
1.88
< .16

Time 2
How many
times did you
have unwanted
thoughts about
the photos?

Time 2
How much did
the thoughts
or feelings
about the
photos
interfere?

2.00
(.23)
2.29
(.19)
2.16
(.24)
.48
< .62

1.52
(.15)
1.51
(.12)
1.4
(.16)
.19
< .82

Immediate Memory Accuracy
Recall that our first hypothesis was that data-driven participants would be less likely to
remember the photos in immediate testing. Therefore, we first analyzed participants’ memory
accuracy immediately after encoding. To do this, we followed Oulton and colleagues (2016)
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methods by calculating the mean proportion of “Old” responses to both Old and New photos. A
3 (condition: conceptually driven, data-driven, and control) x 3 (photo type: old, new, neutral),
mixed model ANOVA confirmed that there was a significant effect of condition on responses to
neutral photos only, F(2, 187) = 6.53, p = .002. Post-hoc Games Howell analyses showed that
those in the data-driven condition responded “Old” during memory testing significantly more
often to neutral photos (e.g., a basket) as compared to the conceptual condition (p = .003). See
Table 4 for the memory accuracy means and standard deviations. Therefore, while there is some
evidence that data-driven encoding affected accuracy, it did not affect our primary measure of
interest: Old responses to New photos.
Table 4
Mean proportion of ‘OLD’ responses (with 95% confidence intervals) for old, new and neutral
photos in each condition.
Condition
Data-Driven

Conceptual

Control

Statistic

.10 [.05, .15]

.01 [.01, .02]

.05 [.02, .08]

Old

.79 [.74, .84]

.84 [.81, .87]

.84 [.80, .87]

New

.29 [.22, .36]

.22 [.17, .28]

.27 [.21, .33]

F(2, 187) = 6.53, p =
.002
F(2, 187) = 1.07, p =
.35
F(2, 187) = 1.63, p =
.20

Photo
Type
Neutral

Memory Amplification
Next we turned to our main interest: whether participant’s memory of the trauma stimuli
amplified between Phase 1 and Phase 2 and whether that differed by condition. Specifically, we
wanted to know whether participants would respond “Old” to more negative photos that were
actually New photos, during the Phase 2 delayed memory test as compared to the Phase 1
immediate memory test. To distinguish between participants’ ability to accurately remember
previously seen traumatic photos (i.e., their sensitivity to these photos) from their response bias
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(i.e., whether they have seen a photo), we used a signal detection approach (Stainslaw &
Todorov, 1999). The data appear in Table 5.
Indeed, one-way ANOVAs for both sensitivity F(2, 187) = 1.48, p = .23) and response
bias (F(2, 187) = .25, p = .78), revealed that our encoding condition manipulation did not have a
significant effect. In other words, encoding condition did not produce differences in participant’s
likelihood of endorsing more traumatic images (response bias) at Phase 2 testing. Likewise, these
findings show that participant’s sensitivity, or their ability to distinguish if they had actually seen
the photograph before, was not effected by encoding condition. Overall, these findings suggest
that perhaps people’s processing style at encoding is not the primary mechanism behind
traumatic memory distortion.
Table 5
Participant’s Response Bias and Sensitivity Means and Standard Deviations
Condition
Mean
Std. Error
Response Bias
Data-driven
1.70
.15
Conceptual
2.04
.12
Control
1.90
.15
Total
1.88
.08
Sensitivity
Data-driven
-0.14
.07
Conceptual
-.10
.06
Control
-.16
.06
Total
-.13
.04

Analogue PTSD Symptoms
To see whether or not participant’s symptoms changed over time, we compared their
Phase 1 and Phase 2 PCL scores. We ran a 2 (PCL scores in Phase 1 and Phase 2) x 3
(conceptually driven, data-driven, and control) ANOVA. Results indicate that there was no
difference between PCL scores amongst the three conditions p < .44). Moreover, there was no
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significant association with change in sensitivity or memory errors over time, p > .05. Therefore,
contrary to our expectations, we did not observe a memory amplification effect here.
General Discussion
The overall goal of our research was to assess if how one encodes a traumatic experience,
affects the memory amplification effect. To do this we first determined if people do, in fact, have
an expectation that focusing on sensory details during a traumatic event is critical to the
development of PTSD, because perhaps these change their expectations for trauma outcomes.
Our Study 1 hypothesis was supported in that participants endorsed the idea that focusing on
sensory details increases the likelihood that a person will develop PTSD. Thus, in Study 2, we
manipulated encoding instructions to see if different encoding styles contribute to the memory
amplification effect.
To do so, in Study 2 we manipulated participants’ encoding strategy for our trauma
analogue. Our results however, did not confirm a relationship between encoding style and the
memory amplification effect, as we originally anticipated. Our response bias and sensitivity
analyses reveal that encoding style had no effect. Likewise, our results did not confirm our Study
2 hypothesis that data-driven participants would be less likely to remember all photos in
immediate testing. Instead, we found that data-driven participants were less likely to remember
target photographs and more likely to endorse remembering neutral photographs than those in
the conceptual and control conditions. Finally, we found no difference in participant’s PTSD
symptoms across conditions. This finding is inconsistent with previous studies, which have
suggested that encoding strategies play a critical role in PTSD symptom changes (e.g., Giosan,
Malta, Jayasinghe, Spielman, & Difede, 2009; Roemer et al., 1998).
One explanation for why we did not find the memory amplification effect by
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manipulating encoding could be that the memory consolidation phase, the time between when
one experiences an event and creates a memory for that event, contributes more to the memory
amplification effect than encoding. Put simply, we may be looking at the wrong phase of
memory. The memory consolidation phase may play a larger role in traumatic memory
amplification compared to encoding, as it has been shown to be a critical point at which
traumatic memories are most vulnerable and malleable (McGaugh, 1996; McGaugh, 2000). A
recent study conducted by Iyadurai, Blackwell, Meiser-Stedman, Watson, Bonsall, Geddes,
Nobre, and Holmes (2017) found that cognitive tasks with high visuospatial demands (they used
the game Tetris), selectively disrupted sensory aspects in memory and limited the occurrence of
intrusions, reducing memory distortions of trauma (Iyadurai et al., 2018). In fact, this task
(playing Tetris) reduced intrusive memories for trauma by 62%- a significant reduction in PTSD
symptoms that could not be drawn from manipulating encoding conditions as we did in the
present study (Iyadurai et al., 2018). By disrupting the memory consolidation phase, Iyadurai and
colleagues (2018) were able to prevent not only a significant amount of memory distortion, but
also reduced critical PTSD symptoms that have been shown to continue to amplify traumatic
memories over time (Iyadurai et al., 2018). Thus, future studies should investigate the effect of
manipulations to the memory consolidation stage in traumatic memory amplification.
Additionally, it may be the case that negative responses to our trauma analogue,
specifically intrusions, caused our participants to generate false memories about the trauma after
their initial encoding exposure. In other words, it may be the case that some people are more
prone to ruminate, or continuously think about their traumatic experiences--which leads to an
increase in intrusions and encourages the memory amplification effect, not the way by which the
experience is originally encoded (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This idea makes sense considering
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that Oulton and colleagues’ study (2016), demonstrated the memory amplification effect without
manipulating encoding. This is critical because their findings point to the possibility of a
mechanism contributing to memory amplification after exposure, not during the encoding phase
as originally hypothesized. Oulton and colleagues (2016) also demonstrated that the relationship
between memory amplification and intrusions was clear; the more re-experiencing symptoms
participants reported, the more likely they were to experience the memory amplification effect
despite finding a non-significant relationship between Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS)
scores and participant’s memory amplification (Oulton et al., 2016). Altogether, perhaps
intrusions are contributing to the memory amplification more than anticipated because they are
altering the original memory of the traumatic experience. Future research should further explore
this relationship to see if people’s tendency to ruminate about their traumatic experiences plays a
larger role in predicting memory amplification over time. Future studies should also continue to
explore why some are more prone to ruminate than others; perhaps the way one ruminates or the
extent to which (i.e., the frequency) one experiences intrusions, can reveal more about who is
more susceptible to memory amplification than encoding has in the present studies.
Alternatively, it is possible that participant’s PTSD symptoms resulted in systematic
information-processing biases--biases that contributed to participants overestimating the amount
of traumatic images they were actually shown, not the way they encoded that information to
begin with (Oulton et al., 2016). The use of information-processing biases has also been shown
in cases studying those with anxiety and depression (co-occurring symptoms of PTSD; Mathews,
1990). Future studies should thus, explore the role these biases may play following the encoding
of traumatic images. Perhaps even, the way by which one encodes a traumatic event, contributes
to their use of this bias, and that is why we see the memory amplification effect occurring over
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time, not soon after encoding.
Lastly, memory amplification may be the result of heuristic use, such as the availability
heuristic, a bias where people rely on information they think they know but actually refer to that
material because it can easily be retrieved from their memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). If
people rely on the availability heuristic to remember their traumatic experiences, it may be the
case these individuals experience more PTSD symptoms overtime because they easily recalled
the negative, traumatic memories they are frequently reminded of via re-experiencing symptoms
like intrusions (Oulton et al., 2016). Future studies should examine correlations between the
availability heuristic and rumination, because this relationship may explain memory distortion
and changes in PTSD symptoms that occur overtime. Overall, our findings do not demonstrate
that encoding contributes to the memory amplification effect nor do they show support for Ehlers
and Clark’s Cognitive Model (2000). However, our findings do have some limitations to be
addressed in future research and provide several implications for the exploration of the memory
amplification effect.
Limitations
First, it is important to acknowledge the inherent limitations in assessing trauma in a
laboratory design. Because we could not expose participants to an actual, real-time traumatic
experience like a deadly car accident, and could only show participants photos of traumatic
experiences, our paradigm is clearly artificial. We also acknowledge that viewing graphic images
does not exactly replicate emotions or physical responses associated with experiencing real
trauma (i.e., intense fear, fight, flight, or freeze responses). Nonetheless, our participants
experienced some degree of negative emotion. Our participants, regardless of encoding
condition, responded negatively to and experienced negative emotional reactions following
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exposure to our trauma analogue. It is important to acknowledge that we did not analyze whether
or not our participants would have met criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. We also only assessed
certain criteria including changes in affect, which inherently limits our generalizability, as our
data does not address all PTSD diagnostic requirements.
Additionally, our sample may not be representative of the entire population. We had to
exclude some participants due to failure to pass our instructional manipulation checks, for not
completing the study, and for experiencing technical difficulties that could have confounded
their responses (i.e., inability to view the traumatic photos). Our sample is also mainly comprised
of female college students who could be biased by their age and gender. Research indicates that
there are indeed sex differences in physiological reactions to emotional stimuli, like trauma,
between males and females (Lang et al., 1993). We did not analyze whether or not our female
participants’ memory accuracy of the traumatic photos was different than that of our male
participants. Thus, we cannot rule out gender differences for memory amplification based on the
present study.
In regards to our paradigm, many of our measures relied on self-reporting. This is not
uncommon for this line of research as many of the measures for PTSD (i.e., PCL-5, EIS, THS)
are made up of self-report questionnaires. However, because self-reports rely on participant’s
own volition when responding, it is possible that their responses were untruthful or inaccurate
(i.e., shame in reporting feelings experienced, or the number of intrusions experienced). We
aimed to control for any individual differences via the random assignment of our participants to
each of the three encoding conditions, but we did not assess for an array of possibilities. Lastly,
because our study was administered online, we do not know if participant’s individual
environment influenced their responses (i.e., being distracted during the encoding phase).
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Implications
Our Study 1 results demonstrate that people do have lay beliefs about the role of
encoding on PTSD symptomology. This is important for future studies as this finding suggests
that these beliefs may alter the expectations for trauma. However, despite not being able to
confirm our Study 2 hypotheses, our findings also yield significant implications. As discussed,
this study is one of few to assess trauma in a controlled, empirical setting. Many studies on this
subject have focused on those pre-disposed to trauma, yielded limited sample sizes, and lacked
control measures (Anastasides et al., 2015; Dickie et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2016; Southwick et
al., 1997). By assessing encoding in a controlled lab environment, we addressed many of these
limitations and were able to control several factors of exposure to trauma that significantly varied
in field studies such as the length of trauma exposure, the type of trauma, and post trauma
exposure assessments.
Further, because our findings suggest that encoding may not be the key to understanding
the memory amplification effect, we have worked to narrow down possible alternatives. Doing
so offers inspiration for several future research projects. First, future research should investigate
the role of rumination in memory amplification. We know from research such as that of Oulton
and colleagues (2016) that rumination regarding a traumatic experience may increase intrusions
and memory distortion. Second, future research should look to assess the frequency of heuristic
use such as that of the availability heuristic, in traumatic memory amplification. Perhaps the use
of heuristics is creating a bias in tandem with rumination where people are endorsing and more
easily retrieving their distorted memories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Overall, the way by which we encode a traumatic event does not appear to influence the
negative emotions, memory distortion, and PTSD symptoms that plague those exposed to
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trauma. Thus, it is critical that the field continue to explore traumatic memory amplification.
Once we identify the driving force behind this phenomenon, we can potentially develop
preventive measures and more appropriate levels of clinical care for those affected. Hopefully
one day, we can prevent the memory distortion and increase in PTSD symptoms that make up
the memory amplification effect.
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Appendix A
Study 1 Informed Consent and Participant Instructions
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College Department of Psychology
Title of Research Study: Perspectives on Trauma
Principal Investigator: Kelsey Barnett, John Jay College
Deryn M. Strange, PhD, Associate Professor John Jay College
You are invited to participate in a research study under the direction of Kelsey Barnett, a Ba/Ma
student at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and Dr. Deryn Strange, an Associate Professor at
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, USA. Thank you for your interest in participating.
You are being asked to participate in this research study because you are over the age of 18.
There will be approximately 300 total participants. In this study, you will see facts and evidence
from an investigation of a crime. At the end of the study, you will answer some questions about
what you have read. The study should take no more than 45 minutes total and you will be
granted course credit upon completion.
Your participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of a
computer and the Internet, and confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the
technology used. Only your responses to each task will be recorded. In accordance with the
requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your coded, anonymous data may be
shared with other competent researchers or used in other related studies. Your participation in
this research is voluntary and you can stop participating at any time. Although there are no direct
benefits to you, your participation will help to expand the scientific literature.
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If you have any questions comments, or concerns, you can contact Kelsey Barnett
(email: Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu) or Dr. Deryn Strange (email: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu). If
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or if you would like to talk to
someone other than the researchers, you can contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator
at 646-664-8918.
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
I have read and understood the information about this research project. I understand the purpose
of this research, what will happen if I participate, and what will happen to the information I
provide. I understand the measures in place to protect my privacy and confidentiality, such that
the information I provide will be coded by a number that does not identify me. I understand that I
can withdraw my consent at any time prior to the end of my scheduled participation, and I do not
have to give a reason.
By clicking the arrow below you are consenting to participate in the study
Instructions:
Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. We are interested in how
newspaper articles about car accidents influence people’s understanding of Post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).
This study will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You will be asked to
read a short paragraph about post traumatic Stress Disorder. You will then be asked to
read a newspaper article about a recent, severe car accident. Lastly, you will answer
follow up questions regarding the article. Once you complete the entire survey, you will
receive credit.
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If at anytime, you do not wish to continue participating, you may exit the survey.
You will not be penalized for failure to complete this study. If you have any questions
please contact the researcher, Kelsey Barnett, at Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu.
When you are ready to begin, please click next.
Appendix B
Study 1 PTSD Introduction Paragraph
Please read the following paragraph about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Posttraumatic stress disorder is a mental health condition that typically follows
exposure to some kind of trauma (i.e., a car accident). Symptoms of PTSD include, but
are not limited, to intrusions (unwanted thoughts or feelings about the traumatic event),
nightmares, anxiety, hyper vigilance, avoidant thinking, dissociation, etc,.
Click next to continue.
Appendix C
Study 1 Newspaper Article
Please read this excerpt from a local newspaper article about a severe car accident:
Women Suffers Several Injuries Following Car Crash On Way to a Night Out with Friends
It was 5:00pm on Tuesday, October 5th

forgetting to put her seatbelt on, sped off

when Alex was leaving her job and headed

onto the highway. Alex told reporters she

to meet up with her friends for dinner. The

usually never uses her cell phone while

restaurant was 20 minutes outside of Alex’s

driving but after each of one her friends

small suburban town, and she was worried

called her to see if she was close to the

about being late. We spoke with Alex, who

restaurant, she decided to call one of them

told us she rushed into her car, and

back to tell them she’d be at least 15
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minutes late. Doing 75 mph in a 55mph

Stacy, told reporters she was talking with

speeding zone, Alex picked up her phone to

Alex when suddenly she heard a loud crash
and Alex’s screams. Stacy knew something
must have gone wrong and tried to call out
for Alex before calling 911. Soon after, Alex
told us she began to hear the sound of sirens
and was able to whisper the words, “help
me.” Alex tried to roll off the car but she

A photo of Alex’s car following the accident

was immobilized by pain she inflicted from

dial her friend’s number when her phone fell

the accident. Every time she tried to wiggle

by her feet. Alex scrambled to get her phone

out of the car the tiny shards of glass that lay

when she heard a loud beep and crash,

around her also cut her. Alex attempted to

throwing her forward out onto the hood of

answer the emergency crew’s questions but

her car. Alex felt the sharp shooting pain of

was exhausted by the pain. Sam, a member

glass cutting through her skin on her arms,

of the emergency crew who helped Alex off

head, and chest as she went through the

of her car, stated that Alex stayed conscious

windshield. She told us that blood covered

throughout the entire process and cooperated

her entire face and began soaking into her

with them as best as she could. In total, Alex

clothes. Alex’s friend, who was still on

had suffered a sprained neck, broken arm,

speakerphone, heard the car crash and

sprained wrist, a severe concussion, and was

started screaming to see if Alex was okay.

given multiple stiches to her head, arms and

Alex could hear her friend calling her name

legs. Alex spent a week in the hospital

but she could not answer her. This friend,

before she could get back to work. We
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caught up with Alex after she was
discharged from the hospital. She told our
reporters that she hopes others will learn
from her accident by wearing their seatbelts,
staying off their phones, and most
importantly stressed, “don’t rush and drive.
Being late is better than being hospitalized
or worse, killed.
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Appendix D
Study 1 Encoding Question
You will now be asked to answer questions about what you have read so far. Click next to
continue.
(Next)
Alex developed PTSD as a result of this accident. Which of the following explanations do
you think is most likely WHY she developed PTSD:
1. Alex focused on the sensory details of the accident (i.e., the sound of the other car’s horn
honking during the crash, the taste of the blood in her mouth, the pain of the glass cutting
into her skin, etc.,).
2. Alex focused on how the accident happened and why it happened to her (i.e., she was
rushing, she went through the windshield because she did not have her seatbelt on, she
dropped her phone and took her eyes off the road and that’s why she did not see someone
hit her, etc.,).
3. It does not matter what Alex focused on during the accident.
Appendix E
Study 1 Confidence Rating and Explanation
Please rate your confidence in your response on the scale below.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Not at all Confident

Completely Confident

Please Use the Additional Space Below to Explain Your Choice:
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Appendix F
Study 1 Debriefing
Thank you for your participation in this study. The goal of this study is to survey if people have a
belief about how encoding, or how memories are processed and stored during traumatic
experiences. We are also interested in whether or not people believe how someone encodes a
traumatic event, effects their PTSD symptomology. Because this study relies on participant’s
reporting their beliefs about traumatic memories and PTSD symptoms, it is important that you do
not talk about this study or share the goal of the study with any others who may take it. If you
have any further questions or concerns about this study, you can contact the following: Kelsey
Barnett: Kelsey.barnett@jjay.cuny.edu or Dr. Deryn Strange: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu. Thank
you again for your participation!
Appendix G
Study 2 IAPS Counterbalancing and Photo Set Structure.
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Appendix H
STAI-I Question Examples
We are unable to provide the entire manual because it would need to be purchased in order to see
the full scale and items.1
Directions: A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, are given
on the following pages. Read each statement and then select the appropriate button to indicate
how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your
present feelings best.
Not at all - Somewhat - Moderately so - Very much so
I feel at ease.*
I feel upset.*
Directions: A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, are given
on the following pages. Read each statement and then select the appropriate button to
indicate how you generally feel.
Almost never - Sometimes - Often - Almost always
I lack self-confidence.*
I am a steady person.*
Gender

Male

Female*

Age: *
Items marked by * are required.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Retrieved From http://www.mindgarden.com/145-state-trait-anxiety-inventory-foradults#horizontalTab2	
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Appendix I
Memory Test Design for Phase 1 and Phase 2

Appendix J
Study 2 Session 1 Informed Consent
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of
Psychology. CONSENT TO PARTICPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT
Project Title: The Strategic Use of Resources During Traumatic Experiences
Principal Investigator: Deryn M. Strange, PhD Associate Professor John Jay College 524
West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 (212) 484-1345
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Introduction/Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is conducted
under the direction of Dr. Deryn Strange, an Assistant Professor at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, USA, and Dr. Melanie Takarangi, a lecturer at the School of Psychology at Flinders. We
are interested in the psychological effects of exposure to stress and emotion (in this case,
stressful photos), and particularly how the strategic use of resources while exposed to the
material effects mood and level of distress.
Procedures: Approximately 2000 individuals are expected to participate in this study. If you
agree to participate in this study, you will participate in two online sessions. In both sessions you
will be shown a series of photographs, and asked some questions regarding the content of the
photos and what you thought about the photos. You will also be asked to do a task assessing your
thinking and attention. The first session will take approximately 45-60 minutes. The second
session will take place a week later. It will take approximately 15 - 30 minutes. Please be aware
that you can ask to stop the experiment at any time without penalty—please contact the
researcher. You are also free to withdraw from the study, at any point before the end of the
session, or to decline to answer particular questions.
Possible Discomforts and Risks: It is important to note that in this study, you will be asked to
view a large number of emotional images, some of which may be very graphic and very negative
(e.g. burns, sexual and physical violence, torture, maltreatment, and death) in nature. Some
people may find these images distressing. Please do not proceed if you do not want to view such
images. A small minority of people also experience distressing memories and reactions in the
week after viewing the photos although these reactions generally subside quite quickly. Please
DO NOT participate in this study if you think that you may be adversely affected by viewing the
photos, or if for example you have been a victim of sexual or physical violence, serious injury
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(burns, car accident, etc).
Benefits: There are no direct benefits from participating in this study. However, participating in
the study may increase general knowledge of the impact of trauma.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not
to participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. If you decide to leave the study, please contact the principal investigator, Deryn
Strange, to inform them of your decision. You may refuse to answer any specific questions or
refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study.
Financial Considerations: Participation in this study will involve no cost you. For your
participation in this study you will receive four research credits after you complete Session 2.
Confidentiality: The data obtained from you will be collected via digital and written document.
The collected data will be accessible to the Principle Investigator – Dr. Deryn Strange, Dr.
Melanie Takarangi, and her research assistants. The researcher will protect your confidentiality
by labeling your data with a participant number, which will not be tied with your name. You will
never be identified in our research project or in any other presentation or publication. Your
videotapes data will be coded following the experiment and erased. The collected data will be
stored in paper and digital format in a locked and secured laboratory. In accordance with the
requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your coded data may be shared with
other competent researchers. Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.
Contact Questions/Persons: If you have any questions about the research now or in the future,
you should contact the Principal Investigator, Deryn Strange (email: dstrange@jjay.cuny.edu). If
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you have any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the
John Jay Human Research Protection Program Office at jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu, or (212) 2378961. In the event of any problems resulting from participation in the study, please contact one
of the following agencies: The National Center for Victims of Crime, link victims with a variety
of important services, including crisis intervention, information, counseling, and support groups.
Phone:1-800-FYI-CALL or 1-800-211-7996 Web:http://www.ncvc.org/ National Sexual Assault
Hotline for services such as counseling, therapy, support groups, and advocacy. Phone:1-800656-4673 Web:http://www.rainn.org Safe Helpline for sexual assault support for military
personnel. Phone:1-877-995-5247 Web:http://www.safehelpline.org/ Safe Horizon for victims
of violence Phone:1-800-621-4673 Web:http://www.safehorizon.org National Center for PTSD
Phone:1-800-273-8255 Web:http://www.ptsd.va.gov
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m Statement of Consent: “I have read the above description of this research and I understand
it. I have been informed of the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been
answered to my satisfaction. Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that
I may have will also be answered by the principal investigator of the research study. I
voluntary agree to participate in this study. By clicking the “yes” box I agree to participate
in the study. I agree to participate. ( ).
Session 2 Informed Consent
Welcome back!
m I agree to participate (1)
ID Please enter your participant ID below. Note: Your participant ID for this study is the letter
"A" followed by your ID number, which could be found on CunyFirst in the Student Center.
During this experiment, we ask that you comply with the following experiment requirements: 1)
Please maximize the size of your web browser so that it covers your entire screen. 2) Please
complete the experiment in a single session, and do not leave the experiment to engage in other
tasks. So don't check your mail, look at Facebook, send or read a text message, get up for a
drink, etc. 3) Please do not use your web browser's back or refresh buttons at any point during
the experiment. 4) Because this experiment requires your close attention, we ask that you
complete the experiment in an environment that is free of noise and distraction. Please do not
speak to anyone, or have anyone near you. Because of the nature of the images that will be
shown, we ask that you be alone in a quiet room. Thank you for your help with these matters.
Continue to the next page when you're ready to begin.
Please wait while the experiment is prepared...
Appendix K
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Study 2 Debriefing
Debriefing Information: Dear participant, Thank you for your participation in this
study. This debriefing is given as an opportunity for you to learn more about this research
project, how your participation plays a part in this research, and why this research may be
important to society. Please do not discuss this study with anyone else who might also
participate in the future. Knowledge about the study may influence their responses and,
essentially, invalidate the information obtained from them. (For this same reason it is important
that you tell the experimenter if you knew details about this study before participating.) This is
part of your responsibilities as a research participant. We originally told you we were interested
in evaluating the impact of self-relevance on responses to graphic material. We were actually
most interested in whether you had intrusive thoughts about the photos you viewed. Specifically,
we were interested in whether experiencing intrusive thoughts can adversely affect peoples’
memory about the photos. We hope you understand why we did not tell you about the true
purpose of our study until now. For example, if you were aware that there would be a memory
test, you would have changed your viewing behavior and would not have been fooled, and we
would be no closer to understanding traumatic memory. It is likely that the results of this
research will be presented at academic conferences and/or published as an article in a
journal. Again, your individual responses will be kept confidential during this process. If you
are interested in the results of this study or if you have any additional questions or comments,
please contact Dr. Melanie Takarangi by email at melanie.takarangi@flinders.edu.au. Please
click Next.
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